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Abstract 
When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold 
even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the 
corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)].  We show that the 
standard Coasean bargaining game involving three parties is strategically equivalent 
to an asymmetric three player majority game.  Hence, when there are three parties, the 
Coase Theorem fails if and only if the core of the corresponding three player majority 
game is empty.  We use this equivalence result to derive all instances in which the 
Coase Theorem will and will not hold with three parties, and show that the Coase 
Theorem will actually hold most (over 80 per cent) of the time.  We also demonstrate, 
in contrast to Aivazian and Callen (2003), that it is always possible to find a set of 
transaction costs which, when introduced into a frictionless bargaining situation, will 
cause an empty core to become non-empty.  In other words, with suitably designed 
transaction costs, it is possible for the Coase Theorem to hold in cases where, in the 
absence of those transaction costs, it would fail to hold.  When there are three parties, 
rather than hindering agreements, transaction costs can encourage Coasean 
bargaining.   
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1. Introduction 
There are two versions of the Coase (1960) theorem that are commonly referred to in 
the literature.
1
  The efficiency version states that if transaction costs are sufficiently 
low, then the initial legal regime or assignment of property rights will not hinder the 
parties from reaching an agreement in which all possible gains from trade have been 
exhausted.  The invariance version states that if transaction costs are sufficiently low, 
then bargaining will always lead to the same level of the activity which generates the 
externality, irrespective of the initial legal regime or assignment of property rights.
2
   
In an important and insightful paper, Aivazian and Callen (1981) showed that when 
there are three parties, both versions of the Coase Theorem can fail to hold even when 
transaction costs are low.  This can happen because of the empty core problem, where 
an agreement between all three parties is unstable.  It is possible that agreements 
between two parties which exclude the third are so profitable that the opportunity cost 
of those two parties entering an agreement with the third party may exceed the 
benefits.  Hence any agreement between all three parties will be susceptible to 
coalitions of two players breaking away, and both versions of the Coase Theorem can 
fail to hold.  
3
  More recently, Aivazian and Callen (2003) extend these arguments, 
and argue that “if the core is empty in the absence of coalition formation costs, then it 
is necessarily empty with such costs.”   
How likely is the kind of instability identified by Aivazian and Callen, and how 
robust is their conclusion that the introduction of transaction costs will not improve 
matters?  This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature.  First, we 
develop a method for deriving all possible examples in which the Coase Theorem 
fails or holds when there are three parties.  Second, we use this method to demonstrate 
that instability is relatively unlikely, and so the Coase Theorem will hold most of the 
time.  Finally, we demonstrate that, in contrast to Aivazian and Callen (2003), the 
                                                 
1
 See Parisi (2008) for a recent summary of the literature on the Coase Theorem.   
2
 Cooter and Ulen (2012), Robson and Skaperdas (2008) and Robson (2012) distinguish between these 
two versions.   
3
 Bernholz (1997) argues that the empty core problem can be solved by the appropriate use of penalty 
clauses which increase the costs of breaking agreements.  These kinds of costs are important, but are 
not the focus of the present analysis.  Instead, we focus on the costs of making agreements.   
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introduction of transaction costs can cause an empty core to become non-empty.  In 
other words, when transaction costs are introduced, the Coase Theorem can hold in 
cases where, in the absence of those transaction costs, it would fail to hold.  Rather 
than hindering agreements, the existence of transaction costs can encourage Coasean 
bargaining.   
2. The Basic Setup 
2.1. The Aivazian-Callen (1981) Example 
To illustrate the main issues, consider the following example, which is well known.  
There are two factories, 1 and 2 , and a group of residents, R.  Both factories emit 
pollution and this reduces the wellbeing of the residents.  In the absence of production 
by the firms, the residents are assumed to enjoy utility of 40.  If both firms produce, 
the residents’ utility falls to 24.  Therefore, production by both factories imposes a 
negative external cost of 16 (=40-24) on the residents.  Suppose factory 1 imposes a 
negative external cost of 9 on the residents, whilst factory 2 imposes a negative 
external cost of 4.  The marginal external cost to the residents is therefore not 
constant.  Finally, assume that if the factories produce alone, they can earn profits of 3 
and 8 respectively.  If they merge and produce together, then they can jointly earn 
profits of 15.  This reflects an assumption of economies of scale in production.   
Note that in this example there is actually more than one class of externality at work.
4
  
The first two externalities are negative, and are caused by the factories reducing the 
residents’ wellbeing.  The second externality is a positive externality – both factories 
producing together increases their joint profits.  We shall see, however, that the mere 
existence of this positive externality is not sufficient to make the Coase Theorem fail 
– it is the size of the positive externality that matters.   
The efficient outcome in this example is for both factories not to produce.  To better 
see how the example works, we transform the example into a cooperative game with 
transferable utility.  Let the characteristic function of this game be v .  Suppose first 
that the factories can produce as much as they wish (a rule of no liability).  Denote the 
value of the grand coalition by Nv .  Then 40Nv  , the total utility available to the 
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 Mueller (2003), page 30, also makes this point.  
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parties when the factories and the residents agree that the factories should shut down 
production.  Notation for other possible coalitions is defined in a similar fashion.  
Under the no liability rule, the characteristic function of this cooperative game is:  
1 2 12 1 23,  8,  24,  15,  31, 36,  40R R R Nv v v v v v v         (1) 
Aivazian and Callen show that the core of this game is empty, and so there is no 
efficient agreement between the parties which is stable against threats by groups of 
two players to reach an agreement on their own.   
Now suppose that the factories must first obtain the residents’ permission to produce.  
Again, let the characteristic function of this game be v , and denote the value of the 
grand coalition by Nv .  Then again we have 40Nv  .  The characteristic function in 
this situation is:  
1 2 12 1 20,  0,  40,  0, 40,  40,  40R R R Nv v v v v v v        
There is no payment that the factories could make to persuade the residents to let 
them produce.  The core is non-empty and has a very simple structure: it is simply the 
point 1 20, 0, 40Rx x x   .  Note, however, that the outcome is not the same as that 
under the no liability rule.  Hence both versions of the Coase Theorem fail to hold in 
this example.   
2.2.  Modifying the Example 
Only a slight modification of the previous example is needed to show how the 
previous result changes.  Consider the same example, but now suppose that if the 
factories merge, they can realise joint profits of 12 rather than 15.  This seems like a 
trivial modification - after all, our previous example featured economies of scale, this 
example simply makes those synergies slightly smaller.  However, modifying the 
example in this way reduces the opportunity cost of firms 1 and 2 entering into 
agreement with the residents.  This reduction in opportunity cost means that the firms 
require less compensation for entering such an agreement, which in turn means that 
the residents’ net benefit will be higher than in the previous case.   
This slight change now renders efficient agreement stable.  The characteristic function 
is now:  
1 2 12 1 23,  8,  24,  12,  31,  36, 40R R R Nv v v v v v v         (2) 
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It is straightforward to show the core of this game is non-empty.  For example, any set 
of agreements which satisfies:  
1 24 ,  8  ,  28Rx x x       
where 0 1  , is feasible and will be stable against deviations by any deviation by a 
single party, as well as any deviation by a subcoalition of two parties.  Hence the core 
is non-empty, and both versions of the Coase Theorem will hold.   
 
3. Deriving All Three Player Examples 
How ubiquitous is the example derived by Aivazian and Callen?  To understand when 
the Coase Theorem will hold and when it will not when there are three parties, we 
consider the following asymmetric three player majority game.
5
  In this game there 
are again three players, 1,2  and R .  When all players all act together, they can obtain 
a payoff of $1.  If any two of them acting together can obtain a payoff smaller than 1, 
with different two player coalitions possibly obtaining different amounts.   The 
characteristic function of this cooperative game is:  
 
 
 
12
1
2
0 if 1
if 1,2
if 1,
if 2,
1 if 3
S R
R
S
S
v S R
S R
S



 



 
 


    (3) 
where    
3
12 1 2, , 0,1R R    .  Suppose that the payments 1 2, , Rx x x  are in the core of 
this game.  Then these payments must be non-negative, and we must have 
1 2 1Rx x x    and 1 2 12 1 1 2 2, ,R R R Rx x x x x x        .  But if this second set of 
inequalities holds, they must also hold if we sum them together, so we must have:  
 1 2 12 1 22 R R Rx x x         
But since 1 2 1Rx x x   , this implies the core is non-empty if and only if 
12 1 2 2R R     .   
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 This game is a more general case the symmetric majority game, which is studied by (for example) 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1995), page 259.  
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To understand the economic structure of the Aivazian-Callen example and how it 
relates to this asymmetric majority game, consider the 0-1 normalisation of a 
cooperative game, which works as follows.
6
  Suppose that we have cooperative game 
with a characteristic function Sv , and which has 0iv   for some i , and 1Nv  .  We 
seek to transform the payoffs of the game such that it is strategically equivalent to the 
original game, but which has 0iv   for all i , and 1Nv  .  This can be done by adding 
(not necessarily positive) numbers iz  to the individual payoff of each individual to 
give them 0iv  .  In other words, set i iz v  .  This number must be added to every 
coalition of which i  is a member.  In particular, the new value of the grand coalition 
must be:  
N i
i
K v z      (4) 
Note that in the context of Coasean bargaining, N i
i
K v z   has the interpretation 
of the total available gains from trade, relative to autarky.  Now, divide the new value 
of every coalition by K .  The resulting characteristic function is strategically 
equivalent to the original game, since each individual’s payoff has been scaled up by 
iz  and divided by a constant K .  Moreover, we have 0iv   for all i , and 1Nv  .  
Thus we have shown:  
 
Lemma: (a) Every three player game in which the Coase Theorem fails to hold is 
strategically equivalent to an asymmetric three player majority game with an empty 
core.   
(b) Every three player game in which the Coase Theorem holds is strategically 
equivalent to an asymmetric three player weighted majority game with a non-empty 
core.   
 
Recall that a cooperative game is cohesive  if 
1
k
K
N S
k
v v

  for all partitions 1{ , , }KS S  
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Ordeshook (1986), page 323.  
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of N .  To study the Coase Theorem, we want to focus on situations where it is 
efficient for the grand coalition to form.  Hence we restrict our attention to cohesive 
games.  But the asymmetric majority game is cohesive; hence the Lemma provides us 
with an algorithm for constructing all three player cohesive cooperative games in 
which the Coase Theorem will and will not hold.   
 
Proposition 1:  Let 1v , 2v  and Rv  be any three positive numbers, and let 
1 2N Rv v v v   .  Then there exists numbers 12v ,  1Rv  and 2Rv  with n ij i jv v v v    
for , 1,2,  , i j R i j   so that:  
(a) If 12 1 2 12 1 2R R R Rv v v v v v     , then the Coase Theorem will not hold; and  
(b) If 12 1 2 12 1 2R R R Rv v v v v v     , the Coase Theorem will hold.   
Moreover, the resulting cooperative game is cohesive.   
Proof: To prove the result, we use the 0-1 normalisation and the previous Lemma.  
Let 1v , 2v  and Rv  be any three positive numbers, let 12 1 2N R Rv v v v   , and let 
1 2[ ]N RK v v v v     be the efficiency gains from full cooperation.  Let 12 1 2, ,R R    
be any three numbers on the interval (0,1) with the property that 12 1 2 2R R     .   
Define 12v , 1Rv  and 2Rv  implicitly by:  
12 1 2
12
v v v
K

 
  
1 1
1
R R
R
v v v
K

 
  
and 
2 2
2
R R
R
v v v
K

 
  
Then, by construction, any game with payoffs such that 12 1 2 12 1 2R R R Rv v v v v v      
will be equivalent to an asymmetric majority game with an empty core, and the Coase 
Theorem will fail to hold.  Similarly, any game with payoffs such that 
12 1 2 12 1 2R R R Rv v v v v v      will be equivalent to an asymmetric majority game with 
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a non-empty core, and the Coase Theorem will hold.   
Note, too, that as long as the resulting game is derived from the asymmetric majority 
game, it will be cohesive, even if 12 1 2 2R R     .  For example, as long as 12v  is 
constructed according to the above procedure, we will have:  
 
  
 
12 12 1 2
1 2 12 1 2
12 12 1 2
12 12
[ ]
1
1
R R
N R R
N R
N N N
v v K v v v
v v v v v v v
v v v v
v v v


 
 
    
      
    
   
 
■ 
The equivalence between the Aivazian-Callen example and the asymmetric majority 
game is not just a theoretical curiosum.  It allows us to construct examples and 
counterexamples.  More importantly, it allows us to investigate how frequently we 
should expect to see the Coase Theorem failing because of the problems of instability 
associated with the empty core, as well as the effects of transaction costs.  These two 
issues are addressed in the remainder of the paper.   
 
4. How Likely is it that the Coase Theorem Will Fail to Hold? 
As discussed above, the equivalence between the three player bargaining game and 
the asymmetric majority game allows us to make precise statements about how likely 
it is that the core will be empty and the Coase Theorem will fail to hold.  Since the 
two classes of games are equivalent, the failure of the Coase Theorem will hold with 
the same frequency that the core of the corresponding asymmetric majority game is 
non-empty, which requires   312 1 2, , (0,1)R R     and 12 1 2 2R R     .  We therefore 
can show:  
Proposition 2:  Suppose that all possible payoffs are equally likely.  Then the Coase 
Theorem holds most of the time.  More precisely, it will hold with probability 5/6.  
Proof: We need to find the probability that 12 1 2 2R R     , given that the points 
 12 1 2, ,R R    are uniformly distributed on the open unit cube 
3(0,1) .  This probability 
is given by:   
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 
 
 
2 1 2
2
2
2
12 1 2 12 1 2
1 1 1
12 1 2
0 1 2
1 1
1 2 1 2
0 1
1 1
1 2 1 2
0 1
1
2
1
1
2 1 1 2
0
1
2
2
2
Pr( 2) 1 Pr( 2)
1
1 1 2
1 1
1
2
11
1 1
2 2
R R R
R
R
R
R R R R
R R
R R R R
R R R R
R
R R R R
R
R
d d d
d d
d d
d
  



     
  
   
   

   

 
  



       
 
    
   
 
    
 
 
      
 
  
 
 

1
2 2 2 2
0
(1 ) (1 )R R R Rd  
   
    
    

  
  
 
 
2
1
2
2 2 2 2
0
2
1
2 2
2 2
0
1
2 3
1
2 2
2
0
0
11
1 1 (1 )  
2 2
1 21
1  
2 2
5
1 1
2 6 6
R
R R R R
R R
R R
R R
R
d
d
d

   
 
 
 

   
        
    
  
    
 
   
       
   



 
■ 
The interpretation of this result is straightforward: whilst it is always possible to 
construct combinations of payoffs such as those obtained by Aivazian and Callen 
(1981) which result in an empty core, with three players these combinations are 
relatively unlikely to occur.  In three player games, the failure of the Coase Theorem 
due to coalitional instability and the emptiness of the core is the exception rather than 
the rule.   
 
5. Transaction Costs 
One of the most important insights of Coase’s (1960) analysis is that if transaction 
costs are sufficiently large, then the legal rule or structure of initial property rights 
matters for efficiency.  Hence, there will exist efficiency enhancing and efficiency 
maximizing rules.   
Avazian and Callen (2003) argue, using a special functional form for coalition 
formation costs, that “if the core is empty in the absence of coalition formation costs, 
 
10 
then it is necessarily empty with such costs.”  Specifically, they assume that 
transaction costs take the following functional form:  
if 1
0 otherwise
k
S
S S
C
 
 

    (5) 
where 1k  .   
These transaction costs are very specific.  Is the result true in general?  Proposition 1 
can be used to show that it is not.   
 
Proposition 3: For every three player bargaining game without transaction costs 
which has an empty core, there exists a transformed bargaining game with a set of 
positive, non-decreasing transaction costs which possesses a non-empty core.   
Proof: Let the original payoffs be 1 2 12 1 2, , , , ,R R Rv v v v v v  and Nv , and suppose that the 
core is empty.  Choose transaction costs in the following way.  For the grand 
coalition, we want NC  to be sufficiently small so that there are still positive gains 
from trade.  Thus:  
 1 2 0N R N Nv v v v C K C       .   
On the other hand, we do not want NC  to be so small that they are exceeded by the 
transaction costs of two-player coalitions.  Hence we will also require:  
 12 1 13max{ , , } 2N R RC K     , which implies that 12 1 1
2
max{ , , }
3 3
N
R R
C
K   
 
  
 
 
Now if 
 12 1 2 2
3N
v v v
K C
 


, set 12 0C  .  If not, set 12C  so that 
 12 12 1 2 2
3N
v C v v
K C
  


.  
Repeat these steps for 1Rv  and 2Rv .  Note that if 12 0C   we have:  
   12 12 1 2
2
3
Nv C v v K C         (6) 
so that:  
 12 12 12
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
N
N N N N
C
C K K C C K C C 
 
         
 
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where the last inequality follows from the choice of  that NC , which satisfied 
 12 1 13max{ , , } 2N R RC K     .  Note that this game is strategically equivalent to a 
cohesive symmetric majority game with 23  , the core of which is non-empty.  ■ 
Hence, as long as the transaction costs associated with reaching an agreement 
between two parties are sufficiently high (relative to the transaction costs associated 
with agreement making between three parties), it is possible that the introduction of 
transaction costs will reduce the opportunity costs of the grand coalition reaching an 
efficient agreement, and a game which has an empty core will become a game with a 
non-empty core.   
It is straightforward to apply this result to the Aivazian and Callen (1981) example 
with an empty core.  In their example, 5K  , and 12 1 2 0.8R R     .  Hence, the 
proof of Proposition 3 suggests that we will need 
   12 1 13max{ , , } 2 5 2.4 2 2N R RC K         .  So, choose 3NC  .  Also, the 
proof of Proposition 3 suggests that we should set:  
  2312 12 12
2 2 2 2
2 0.8 5 2
3 3 3 3
N NC K K C C K 
   
            
   
 
with 12 1 2R RC C C  .   
Then the characteristic function for the new game with transaction costs is:  
1 1 1
1 2 12 1 23 3 3
3,  8,  24,  12 ,  28 , 33 , 37R R R Nv v v v v v v          
which is cohesive and has a non-empty core.  Hence, the introduction of suitably 
chosen transaction costs into the Aivazian and Callen (1981) makes a non-empty core 
empty.  Transaction costs can encourage Coasean bargaining.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the equivalence between the three party bargaining game 
studied by Aivazian and Callen (1981) and an asymmetric majority game to derive a 
number of results.  We showed that when there are no transaction costs, the instability 
identified by Aivazian and Callen will occur relatively infrequently.  Indeed, if all 
payoff combinations are equally likely, then Coasean bargaining is five times more 
likely than not.  In the those cases where instability could arise due to the emptiness 
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of the core, it is possible to find a set of transaction costs which completely eliminates 
this as a source of instability and a barrier to Coasean bargaining.   
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